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Business security 6 min read

DMARC Setup with SPF and DKIM for Indian Businesses

A DMARC setup guide for Indian businesses: publish SPF, sign mail with DKIM, start DMARC at p=none, read the reports, then move to quarantine and reject.

By Editorial team, Research and writing · Published
Colleagues around a meeting table reviewing documents and laptops together

In short

  • SPF says which servers may send for your domain, DKIM signs each message, and DMARC tells receivers what to do when both fail.
  • Start DMARC at p=none to collect reports for a few weeks; it breaks nothing and shows you every system sending as you.
  • Most Indian setups forget the ERP, the bulk-SMS vendor's email gateway, the CRM and the helpdesk tool. Find them before you enforce.
  • Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject. Reject is the setting that actually stops exact-domain spoofing.
  • DMARC does not stop lookalike domains or a hacked mailbox. Pair it with awareness training and payment verification rules.

Who this is for: IT administrators, founders and finance heads at Indian companies that send email from their own domain, whether through Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho or an in-house server.

An email arrives in your accounts team's inbox. The sender shows as your managing director's address, the signature is right, and it asks for a vendor payment to a "new account". Nothing was hacked. Someone simply sent mail claiming to be from your domain, and nothing told the receiving server to refuse it.

This guide walks through a DMARC setup, with the SPF and DKIM records it depends on, in the order that does not break your outgoing mail. It assumes you can edit DNS for your domain and nothing more. Email spoofing of exact company domains is the easiest attack to close, and most Indian firms we see have not closed it.

What the three records do

Each record answers a different question for the server that receives your mail.

  • SPF (Sender Policy Framework) lists the servers allowed to send mail for your domain. An SPF record is a single TXT entry in DNS.
  • DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to each message so the receiver can check it was not altered and came from a system holding your private key. DKIM signing is switched on in your mail platform, and the public key is published in DNS.
  • DMARC tells receivers what to do when a message fails both checks (nothing, quarantine, or reject), and where to send reports about what they saw.

SPF and DKIM on their own are advisory. Receivers still deliver failing mail. DMARC is the policy that turns the checks into a decision, which is why it is the record that matters most and the one most often missing.

Step 1: find every system that sends as you

Before touching DNS, list every service that sends email with your domain in the From address. In Indian companies this list is longer than people expect: the mail platform itself, the accounting or ERP system that emails invoices, the CRM, the helpdesk tool, the HR or payroll portal, the marketing newsletter tool, the website's contact form, the bulk SMS vendor that also offers email, and any old server a previous IT person set up.

You will not find them all on the first pass. That is what the reporting phase is for. But a first list prevents the most common mistake, which is enforcing a policy that silently drops invoice emails from the ERP.

Step 2: publish the SPF record

Your mail provider publishes the exact include statement to use. The record lives at the root of your domain as a TXT entry and looks like this:

v=spf1 include:_spf.yourprovider.example include:erp-vendor.example -all

Add one include per legitimate sender. End with -all (hard fail) once you are confident, or ~all (soft fail) while you are still discovering senders. Two rules: only one SPF record per domain, and no more than ten DNS lookups in total across all includes. Exceeding either makes SPF fail for everyone, including you.

Step 3: turn on DKIM signing

In your mail platform's admin console, generate a DKIM key for the domain, publish the public key as a TXT record at the selector name the platform gives you, then enable signing. Repeat for each third-party system that can sign (most reputable ERP and marketing tools can; some Indian SMS-and-email gateways cannot, and those are candidates for replacement). Send a test message to a personal mailbox and view the headers; you want to see dkim=pass.

Step 4: DMARC setup at p=none, and read the reports

Now publish the DMARC record. It is a TXT entry at _dmarc.yourdomain:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain; pct=100

The policy p=none changes nothing about delivery. Its purpose is the rua address: receivers such as Gmail and Microsoft will send daily aggregate reports listing every source IP that sent mail as your domain, and whether each passed SPF and DKIM. Those aggregate reports are how you find the ERP in Pune that nobody told you about, and the spoofing attempts you did not know were happening.

Leave it at none for three to six weeks. The UK NCSC publishes a plain-language anti-spoofing guide that explains the report format well. Use a free parser or a reporting service to read the XML. Every legitimate source that fails should be fixed (added to SPF, or configured for DKIM) before you move on.

Step 5: move to quarantine, then reject

When the reports show your legitimate senders passing, change the record to p=quarantine. Failing mail now goes to spam folders rather than inboxes. Watch the reports for another two to four weeks. Then set p=reject, the reject policy under which receivers refuse failing mail outright. That is the setting that stops exact-domain spoofing; anything short of it is a warning, not a lock.

Use the pct tag to phase in enforcement if you are nervous: pct=25 applies the policy to a quarter of failing mail. And add sp=reject so that subdomains nobody uses cannot be spoofed either.

Mistakes we see in Indian setups

Check these before you enforce

  • Two SPF records on the same domain, usually one from the website host and one from the mail provider; merge them
  • An SPF record that still includes a vendor the company stopped using in 2022
  • DKIM enabled on the mail platform but not on the ERP that sends every invoice
  • A parked or old domain with no DMARC at all; it can be spoofed freely, and should get p=reject with no SPF senders
  • Reports sent to a mailbox nobody reads
  • Marketing team using a tool that sends "from" the company domain without own-domain DKIM

What DMARC does not do

Honesty about limits keeps you safe. DMARC protects your exact domain. It does nothing about a lookalike domain registered yesterday with one letter changed, and most business email compromise now uses lookalikes or a genuinely compromised mailbox rather than raw spoofing. How those attacks fool finance staff is in our explainer on business email compromise, and the human defences are in what actually works in awareness training.

The rule that closes the gap is procedural: any change to a vendor's bank account, or any payment request that arrives by email, is confirmed by a phone call to a number you already had. No DNS record substitutes for that call. Where a loss has already occurred, the reporting steps in how to report cyber crime apply to companies as much as to individuals, and the 1930 helpline will take a corporate complaint.

DMARC also does not help if your own mailboxes are weak. Phishing of staff credentials, covered in our phishing explainer, is still the main way into a company, so multi-factor login on every mailbox is the companion step. If an incident does happen, the six-hour reporting duty to CERT-In applies to organisations, and your incident response plan should already say who files it.

A realistic timeline

WeekActionRisk to delivery
1Inventory senders; publish SPF with ~all; enable DKIM on main platformNone
2Publish DMARC p=none with reporting addressNone
3 to 6Read aggregate reports; fix each legitimate sourceNone
7Move to p=quarantine; tighten SPF to -allLow, if reports were clean
10 to 12Move to p=reject; add sp=rejectLow

Next step: open your DNS console today and look for a TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain. If there is none, publish one at p=none with a reporting address before you close the tab. It takes five minutes, breaks nothing, and starts the clock on everything else. If you would rather have it done and documented, our email security service handles the inventory, the records and the enforcement schedule. The broader sequence for a small firm is in our starter guide.

Frequently asked questions

Will DMARC stop all fake emails pretending to be my company?

No. DMARC at p=reject stops messages that use your exact domain without authorisation. It does nothing about a lookalike domain (yourcompany-india.com instead of yourcompany.com) or about a real mailbox of yours that has been taken over. Those need brand monitoring and strong login protection respectively.

Can DMARC break our outgoing email?

Only if you enforce before every legitimate sender is covered. That is why the process starts with p=none, which changes nothing about delivery and only generates reports. Move to quarantine and reject after the reports show that your ERP, CRM, helpdesk and marketing tools all pass.

What is the 10-lookup limit in SPF?

An SPF record may trigger at most ten DNS lookups in total, including the ones inside any include: statements. Companies that add every vendor's include eventually exceed it, and the record fails silently. Flatten or trim includes, and remove vendors you no longer use.

Do we need a paid DMARC reporting tool?

Not to begin. Aggregate reports arrive as XML files and are readable with free parsers. A paid dashboard becomes worth it when you have many domains or many sending systems. Start free, see what the reports look like, and decide.

We are a small firm with five mailboxes on Google Workspace. Is this still worth it?

Yes, and it is easier for you. Google publishes the SPF include and DKIM setup; you add three DNS records and a reporting address. Small firms are targeted precisely because attackers assume nobody set this up, and a spoofed email to a client asking for payment to a new account is a direct loss.

If you want help with this

  • Email security and BEC prevention · Business email compromise is how Indian companies lose the most money to a single incident. We harden your domain, your mailboxes and your payment-change process so a changed bank account gets caught before it is paid.
  • Incident response and SOC analyst foundations · training · A four-week part-time course for IT staff moving into security, covering log analysis, alert triage, phishing and malware investigation, incident handling, and CERT-In reporting, with a lab every week.
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Editorial team

Research and writing