Skip to content

Lost money to a cyber fraud? Call 1930 now and file at cybercrime.gov.in. The first hour matters.

What to do, step by step →
Cyber Crime Help Desk An initiative from Kramate for Society
Business security 6 min read

Business Email Compromise: How Accounts Teams Get Fooled

Business email compromise explained for Indian finance teams: the vendor bank-change script, CEO fraud on WhatsApp, and the one control that stops it.

By Editorial team, Research and writing · Published
Colleagues around a meeting table reviewing documents and laptops together

In short

  • Business email compromise is a fraud against process, not technology: the attacker convinces a person with payment authority to send money to the wrong account.
  • The four scripts are vendor bank-change, CEO urgent transfer, payroll diversion and the lawyer or acquisition pretext; all depend on urgency and secrecy.
  • Attackers often sit inside a real mailbox for weeks, using forwarding rules to read invoice threads before striking.
  • The control that works is call-back verification on a known number for any bank-account change or unusual payment, with no exceptions for the boss.
  • If money has gone, call 1930 within the hour; the bank will treat the transfer as authorised, so the freeze is the only realistic recovery.

Who this is for: CFOs, finance managers, accounts and payables staff, company secretaries and owners who approve payments.

The email arrives on a Thursday afternoon from a supplier the company has paid for six years. Same name, same signature, same thread. "We have moved our account to a new bank for GST reasons; please use the attached details for the pending invoice." The accounts executive updates the vendor master. The ₹38 lakh payment on Monday goes to a mule account in another state. That is business email compromise, and nothing was hacked at the bank.

This explainer is for the people who approve and make payments. It shows the four scripts, how attackers get the information that makes them convincing, why the bank will not refund the money, and the single control that defeats every variant.

What business email compromise actually is

Business email compromise (BEC) is a fraud against a payment process. The attacker does not break into the bank. They convince someone with authority to send money to an account they control, by impersonating a person or company the victim already trusts. Sometimes the impersonation uses a compromised real mailbox; sometimes a lookalike domain; increasingly, a WhatsApp message with the right photo.

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center has ranked BEC among the costliest categories in its annual reports for years, with reported losses in the billions of dollars globally. In India the cases arrive at cyber cells as "cheating" complaints from companies, and because the transfer was authorised by staff, they sit outside the RBI's zero-liability protection. The phishing page covers the delivery mechanism; this article covers the fraud itself.

The four scripts

1. The vendor bank-change

The most expensive and most common. The attacker reads a genuine invoice thread, then at the right moment sends a bank-change notice from the supplier's address or a lookalike. The letter on letterhead, the cancelled cheque image and the GST reasoning are all forged or lifted from earlier emails. The payment goes out on the normal cycle, and the real supplier calls two weeks later asking where it is.

2. CEO fraud

An email or WhatsApp from the "MD" or "CEO" to the finance head: in a meeting, cannot talk, need a vendor paid or an acquisition deposit sent today, keep it confidential. The pressure is seniority plus urgency plus secrecy. Startups and founder-led companies are especially exposed because everyone is used to the founder asking for things fast.

3. Payroll diversion

An email to HR from an "employee" asking to update their salary account. Small amounts, repeated across several staff, discovered on payday when real employees are not paid.

4. The lawyer, auditor or acquisition pretext

A message from a "law firm" or "auditor" about a confidential transaction requiring an immediate transfer, often timed around a real deal the attacker has read about in the mailbox. The secrecy instruction stops the victim checking with colleagues.

ScriptWho is impersonatedWho is targetedThe tell
Vendor bank-changeA real supplierAccounts payableNew bank details, often a different bank or state from before
CEO fraudOwner, MD, CFOFinance head, assistantUrgency, secrecy, cannot take a call
Payroll diversionAn employeeHR, payrollSalary account change by email alone
Lawyer or deal pretextLaw firm, auditor, counterpartyFinance, foundersConfidential deal, immediate deposit

How they know so much

The convincing detail comes from reading real email. The attacker phishes one password, usually through a fake Microsoft 365 or Google login page sent as a "shared document" or "voicemail". Once inside, they do three things. They search the mailbox for invoices, bank details and payment schedules. They create mailbox forwarding rules so that any message containing "invoice", "payment" or "bank" is copied to an external address, and often auto-deleted from the inbox so nobody notices. And they wait, sometimes for weeks, for a payment large enough to be worth the single shot they get.

When they are ready, they either send from the compromised mailbox itself, or register a lookalike domain (an extra letter, a swapped character, .co instead of .com) and reply into the thread so the conversation history looks intact. Our Gmail security guide shows where forwarding rules hide; the same checks apply in Microsoft 365 under mail settings.

The control that works: call-back verification

Every script above survives technical controls and dies on one habit. Any request to change bank details, add a beneficiary or make an unusual or urgent payment is confirmed by telephone, on a number already on file from before the request, with a person known to the team. Not a number in the email signature. Not a reply to the email. Not a WhatsApp message back. A call.

The payment-verification rule, written down

  • No vendor bank-account change is actioned without a call to the vendor's known contact on a number from the existing master record
  • No new beneficiary is added and paid on the same day without a second person's approval
  • Any request from the owner, MD or CFO for an urgent or confidential payment is confirmed by calling them; the owner signs this rule and expects to be called
  • Salary account changes require the employee to confirm in person or by video, not by email
  • Lookalike domains: the sender address is read character by character on any payment-related email
  • Payment-related emails that arrive after hours, before holidays or during the boss's travel are treated as higher risk, not lower

Technical measures help at the edges. Multi-factor authentication on every mailbox makes the initial phishing far less useful. SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your domain stop exact spoofing of your own addresses; the setup guide is short. A warning banner on external email makes a lookalike reply stand out. A quarterly check of mailbox rules across the company catches silent forwarding. Email security hardening covers all of these, and the finance team training drills the call-back rule with real examples until it is automatic.

If the money has already gone

  1. Call 1930 within the hour. Give the transaction reference, amount, beneficiary account and IFSC. The complaint reaches the beneficiary bank through CFCFRMS and can freeze whatever is still in the account. How that works is explained separately.
  2. Ask your bank for a recall. In writing, the same day, with the 1930 acknowledgement. Banks can request the beneficiary bank to hold funds; they cannot compel it, so speed matters.
  3. File on cybercrime.gov.in and get an FIR for cheating under BNS section 318 and cheating by personation under IT Act section 66D. The FIR is needed for the magistrate's order releasing frozen funds and for any insurance claim.
  4. Report to CERT-In within six hours if a mailbox was compromised; it is a reportable incident under the 2022 directions. Here is how.
  5. Secure the mailboxes. Reset passwords, remove forwarding rules, revoke sessions, enable MFA, and tell the supplier to do the same.
  6. Expect the recovery-agent call. Someone will offer to retrieve the money for a fee. No one can; frozen funds come back through the magistrate.

The RBI circular of 6 July 2017 protects customers from unauthorised transactions. A BEC transfer was authorised by your staff, so the bank will decline a refund on that basis. Some business cyber policies cover social engineering losses with a sub-limit; check the clause before you need it.

Write the verification rule today and have the owner sign it. Then run a ten-minute exercise with the accounts team: show them a real vendor bank-change email and ask what they would do. If the answer is "call the vendor on the old number", you have the control. If you want help with a live case or with hardening the mailboxes, our incident response team handles both.

Frequently asked questions

How did the fraudster know our supplier's invoice numbers and amounts?

Either your mailbox or the supplier's was compromised, usually through a phished password, and the attacker read the invoice thread for weeks. They often add a forwarding rule so copies keep arriving after the password changes. Check both sides' mailboxes for rules, and assume the attacker has seen every email in that thread.

Our MD messaged on WhatsApp from a new number asking for an urgent transfer. Is that BEC?

Yes, the WhatsApp variant. The attacker uses the MD's photo and name, says they are in a meeting or travelling, and asks the finance head to pay a vendor or buy gift cards immediately and quietly. The defence is identical: call the MD on the number you already have. A real MD will not object to a thirty-second call.

Will the bank refund a payment we made to a fraudster?

Usually not. The transfer was initiated and authorised by your staff, so it is not an unauthorised transaction under the RBI limited-liability circular. Call 1930 immediately so the receiving account can be frozen; file on cybercrime.gov.in; write to your bank asking it to request a recall from the beneficiary bank. Recovery depends on speed.

Does DMARC stop business email compromise?

It stops one method: exact spoofing of your own domain. It does nothing against a lookalike domain, a compromised real mailbox or a WhatsApp message. Publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC because they close a door cheaply, but the process control, call-back verification, is what stops the fraud regardless of the method.

We are a small firm. Are we really a target?

Yes, because small firms pay invoices without a second approver and have no one watching the mailbox. Attackers choose targets by how easy the payment process is, not by company size. A firm with one person who both receives invoices and makes payments is the ideal victim.

If you want help with this

  • Email security and BEC prevention · Business email compromise is how Indian companies lose the most money to a single incident. We harden your domain, your mailboxes and your payment-change process so a changed bank account gets caught before it is paid.
  • Incident response and digital forensics · Ransomware, a compromised mailbox, a data leak or an insider walking out with the database. We contain first, investigate properly, handle the CERT-In and DPDP reporting, and leave you with evidence that holds up.
  • Finance and accounts: business email compromise and invoice fraud · training · A two-hour session for CFOs, accounts payable and treasury on how business email compromise and invoice fraud are run against Indian companies, and the callback rule that stops them.
Talk to us
E

Written by

Editorial team

Research and writing